SOFEMA
AVIATION SERVICES

F-16 Maintenance Error Case Study: Hydraulic System Misconnection

A detailed analysis of a serious maintenance incident involving human factors and systemic failures. This case examines how a single technician's error during routine hydraulic system maintenance on an F-16C resulted in a potentially catastrophic flight control malfunction, caught only during pre-flight checks.



Incident Overview

Aircraft Details

Type: F-16C Block 40

Location: Base Maintenance Facility

Date: March 2019

Task: Scheduled hydraulic system system component replacement replacement

Outcome: Ground abort, no injuries, aircraft damage prevented

The Error

During replacement of a hydraulic pump servo valve, servo valve, A Senior Airman incorrectly cross-cross-connected two hydraulic lines serving the the primary and utility flight control systems. The The error went undetected through initial quality quality assurance checks but was identified during during ground operational testing before flight. flight.

The misconnection could have resulted in reversed reversed flight control inputs during flight, potentially causing loss of aircraft control.

Sequence of Events Leading to the Error

1

08:00 – Task Assignment

The Senior Airman, a certified 5-level technician with 18 months' F-16 experience, received work order for servo valve replacement on System A hydraulic pump. Task estimated at 4 hours. The Airman had performed this procedure twice before, most recently 6 months prior.

2

09:30 – Work Commencement

The Airman began work without reviewing technical order (TO 1F-16CG-2-70GS-00-1) in detail, relying on memory from previous experience. He noted the TO was available on a nearby tablet but felt confident proceeding without it. No pre-task briefing was conducted with the shift supervisor.

3

10:15 – Critical Disconnection

The Airman disconnected four hydraulic lines from the servo valve assembly. Due to to workspace congestion and poor lighting in the wheel well area, he did not immediately tag immediately tag the lines with their corresponding positions. He placed disconnected lines disconnected lines temporarily against the bulkhead whilst removing the faulty component. component.

4

11:00 – Interruption

The Airman was called away to assist with an unrelated urgent aircraft recovery for for approximately 25 minutes. Upon return, he did not reorient himself to the task or consult or consult the technical order before continuing. The hydraulic lines had shifted position position during his absence.

5

11:45 – Erroneous Reconnection

The Airman reconnected the hydraulic lines to the new servo valve, inadvertently swapping swapping the primary and utility system pressure lines. The similar appearance of fittings and fittings and obscured identification markings contributed to the error. He torqued all torqued all connections per technical specifications.

6

12:30 – Initial QA Inspection

The Supervising Staff Sergeant performed quality assurance inspection, verifying torque torque values and safety wire installation. However, the inspection checklist did not not specifically require verification of correct line routing, and The Staff Sergeant did not did not independently verify connections against technical data.

7

14:00 – Ground Test Detection

During powered ground operational checks, flight controls responded opposite to to commanded inputs. Maintenance supervision immediately grounded the aircraft and aircraft and launched an investigation. The cross-connected hydraulic lines were discovered discovered during troubleshooting.

SOFEMA AVIATION SERVICES

Investigation Findings: Human Factors Analysis

Technician Interview Results

Post-incident interviews with the Airman revealed several critical insights into his decision-making process and the conditions surrounding the error. The Airman error. The Airman acknowledged he had not consulted the technical order during the reconnection phase, stating he "felt confident" based on previous experience. previous experience. He admitted the interruption had disrupted his mental model of the task but felt pressure to complete the job within the estimated estimated timeframe.

Memory-Based Performance

The Airman relied on recall rather than technical data, a common deviation when technicians become familiar with procedures. This "knowledge-based" error occurred because similar fittings appeared interchangeable without careful verification.

Task Interruption Impact

The 25-minute interruption caused The Airman Airman to lose situational awareness. Research Research shows interruptions during manual manual tasks significantly increase error rates, rates, particularly when technicians fail to restart from a verified checkpoint.

Environmental Factors

Poor lighting and restricted workspace in the F- the F-16 wheel well area reduced the Airman 's Airman 's ability to visually verify component component identification. He reported difficulty reading stamped markings on hydraulic fittings.

Contributory Factors: The Swiss Cheese Model

The investigation identified multiple defensive layers that failed simultaneously, allowing the error to occur. No single factor was sufficient to cause the incident; rather, holes in successive defences aligned to permit the hazard to materialise.

1

Individual Level

- Overconfidence in procedural memory
- Failure to use technical order as primary reference
- Inadequate error recovery after interruption
- Did not tag or mark disconnected components

2

Team Level

- No pre-task briefing conducted with with supervisor
- Quality assurance inspection focused on focused on end-state verification rather rather than process compliance
- Lack of peer review culture for complex tasks

3

Organisational Level

- QA checklist did not require verification of correct component routing
- Inadequate lighting provisions in wheel wheel well workspace
- No formal policy requiring task restart procedures after interruptions
- Production pressure emphasised schedule adherence over methodical practice
- Training did not adequately address error-likely situations

Lessons Learnt and Corrective Actions

Key Takeaways

This incident demonstrates how competent, experienced technicians can make critical errors when multiple defences fail. defences fail. Human factors such as overconfidence, task interruption, and environmental stressors combined with systemic systemic weaknesses in quality assurance and procedural guidance. guidance.

The error was ultimately caught before flight, highlighting the importance of comprehensive ground testing as a final defensive layer.

Implemented Changes

1. Revised QA inspection procedures to include verification of component routing against technical data
2. Mandatory technical order consultation for all hydraulic system work, regardless of technician experience
3. New protocol requiring formal task restart procedures following interruptions exceeding 15 minutes
4. Enhanced lighting installed in F-16 wheel well maintenance areas
5. Pre-task briefing requirement for all flight control system maintenance maintenance
6. Updated training curriculum emphasising error-prone conditions and recovery strategies

Source: This case study is based on USAF safety investigation findings and human factors analysis. Details have been simplified for instructional purposes whilst maintaining technical accuracy of the incident sequence and causal factors.

Notes