EASA have a duty of care as well! Who audits the auditor?
It is not until a serious event or accident that such issues come to light, for example in the aftermath of the Helios Boeing 737 accident on 14 April 2005, a Class Action was initiated against the Cypriot DCA charging loose enforcement of regulations.
We are still today seeing less than adequate communications which should also  be considered if not “hidden” then obscured requirements issued by EASA.
In the aftermath of the Disaster of TWA 800 which exploded in July 1996 EASA (correctly and rightly) issued the following documents (amended):
Annex I to ED Decision 2009-006-R
Annex 1 of Decision 2009-007-R
This was in response to the work performed by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).
In a similar time frame and following another equally serious disaster that of Swissair 111 which crashed into the sea of the coast of Nova Scotia in September 98.
The Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee ATSRAC., in their deliberations made a number of recommendations; the majority of these were incorporated into AMC material AMC 20-21, AMC 20 -22 and AMC 20-23.
Whilst the AMC’ s were placed on the EASA web site in August 2008 there was no primary requirements driving the obligations of an organization to deliver training.
Why did EASA do it this way, when there is no fundamental or rational reason. Why in the case of FTS is training made mandatory with a compliance date, whilst in the in the case of EWISÂ it appeared as an organizational obligation, without compliance and without any primary obligation.
This changed in 2011 in the case of Part 145 – see ED Decision 2011/011/R AMC 4 145.A.30) (e) Personnel Requirement.
Competence assessment should include the verification for the need for additional training when relevant – reference to AMC20-22  (why did it take 3 ½ years to issue this and why has it still not been included into the requirements for Part M ?)  – but not in respect of Part M CAMO organisations (many of whom have still not provided training to there staff some 5 years later !)
What is the answer?
Well one answer which is achievable now is for industry to step up to protect itself. It is a fact that, many organizations focus solely on the need to comply with regulatory requirements.
To maintain the safest possible operating environment Operators and Maintainers, should look past compliance, off course we MUST meet every requirement head on, but there are many other additional  issues which have to be dealt with specifically because they are not driven hard enough by the regulator. ( Issues which impact on training, process procedures and competence across all areas of the business.)
Eventually a lack of regulation is usually addressed, specifically if it is impacted by an incident or accident. This is wrong because the focus should be on organizational diligence, rather than waiting to be told what to do.
In many EASA countries it appears that the regulators are not strong enough to enforce the regulations and apparently have not learnt lessons from the Cypriot authorities.
This has to change and just as it is important to manage effectively the competence in Industry so to must this be done in all regulatory authorities, How is competence assessed measured and managed it is as relevant today as it ever was.
In the mean time Operators and Maintenance Organisations need to come to terms with the rules so that they are able not to just comply but to embrace them and embed them with the Organization in the most effective way possible.
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Tags:
Annex 1, EASA, Part 145, part M, Part M CAMO organisations, Sofema Aviation Services
